Owner-Intruder contests with information asymmetry

Jay Bisen¹ ; Faheem Farooq¹ ; Manaeil Hasan¹ ; Akhil Patel² ; Jan Rychtář³ ; Dewey Taylor³

¹ Department of Biology, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2012, USA.
² Department of Biomedical Engineering, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-3068, USA.
³ Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2014, USA.

Mathematical modelling of natural phenomena, Tome 16 (2021), article no. 17.

Résumé

We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals – the Owner and the Intruder – and model the situation as a sequential game in an extensive form. The Owner is in possession of a resource when another individual, the Intruder, comes along and may try to steal it. If the Intruder makes such a stealing attempt, the Owner has to decide whether to defend the resource; if the Owner defends, the Intruder can withdraw or continue with the stealing attempt. The individuals may value the resource differently and we distinguish three information cases: (a) both individuals know resource values to both of them, (b) individuals know only their own valuation, (c) individuals do not know the value at all. We solve the game in all three cases. We identify scenarios when it is beneficial for the individuals to know as much information as possible. We also identify several scenarios where knowing less seems better as well as show that an individual may not benefit from their opponent knowing less. Finally, we consider the same kind of interactions but without the option for the Intruder to withdraw. We find that, surprisingly, the Intruder typically fares better in that case.

Détail

DOI : 10.1051/mmnp/2021006

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